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Abstract 
The Chinese Communist Party has chosen to base the legitimacy of its rule on its perform-
ance as leading national power. Since national identity is based on shared imaginations of 
and directly tied to territory – hence place, this paper analyses both heterodox models for 
identification on the national and potentially competing place-based collective identities 
on the local level. This analysis, based on communication within a number of popular 
communication forums and on observation of behavior in the physical reality of today’s 
urban China, shows that communication within the virtual and behavior in the real world 
are not separated realities but form a new virreal spatial continuum consisting of imagined 
places both online and offline. I argue that ties to place are stronger and identities con-
structed on shared imaginations of place are more salient the more direct the experience of 
place is – be the place real, virtual or virreal. Hence in China challenges to one-party rule 
will probably accrue from competing localized collective identities rather than from het-
erodox nationalism. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Parteihegemonie vor dem Ende? Identität und neue virreale Räume in China 
Die Kommunistische Partei Chinas (KPCh) hat ihre politische Legitimität als allein herr-
schende Kraft an ihre Fähigkeit geknüpft, erfolgreich als führende nationale Kraft zu  
agieren. Da nationale Identität auf geteilten Imaginationen beruht und direkt an Territori-
um – also Lokalität – gebunden ist, werden in diesem Artikel heterodoxe Identifikations-
modelle auf nationaler und möglicherweise konkurrierende kollektive Identitäten auf lo-
kaler Ebene untersucht. Diese Untersuchung auf der Grundlage einer qualitativen Analyse 
von populären Kommunikationsforen des chinesischen Internet sowie teilnehmender Be-
obachtung in ausgewählten städtischen Zentren Chinas verdeutlicht, dass Kommunikati-
on im virtuellen und Verhalten im realen Raum keine voneinander getrennten Wirklich-
keiten darstellen, sondern ein neuartiges virreales räumliches Kontinuum bestehend aus 
imaginierten Orten online und offline darstellen. Beziehungen zu einer gegeben Lokalität 
sind umso enger und darauf gründende Identitäten umso stärker, je direkter die Lokalität 
vom Individuum erfahren wird – unabhängig davon, ob es sich dabei um reale, virtuelle 
oder virreale Lokalitäten handelt. Als Folge wird die bestehende Einparteienherrschaft 
primär von Seiten konkurrierender lokalisierter Identitäten in Frage gestellt werden, nicht 
jedoch von heterodoxen Modellen nationaler Identifikation. 
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1. Introduction 
More than 25 years ago the Chinese Communist Party embarked on its path for moderniza-
tion, reform and opening of the country to the outside world1. Since then, state and party 
have withdrawn in the course of economic reforms and political decentralization as norma-
tive authorities from a growing number of social contexts. As a result of these developments 
the CCP has – so far successfully – undergone a radical re-definition: In order to facilitate 
economic reform and to perpetuate one-party rule in China the party disembarked from 
communist orthodoxy, which already had lost much of its former attractiveness, and re-
configured itself as leading and only power of both economic modernization and national 
self-strengthening. Thus the Communist Party has tied its political fate to its performance as 
the leading nationalist power, its successful role in strengthening the country and hence has 
                                                     
1  This article presents results of a larger research project on “Chinese Identities in the Internet 
Age”, directed by Karsten Giese and generously funded by the Volkswagen Foundation. A re-
search monograph is under preparation. The project is fully documented on the Internet: 
www.chinabbsresearch.de. 
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striven to construct a self-image based on shared national identity. As a result, heterodox 
discourses on national identity and the construction of alternative or competing collective 
identities on all social levels may create causes for political struggle and eventually chal-
lenge the existent power balance.  
Growing social differentiation and diversification, on the other hand, have at least in theory 
also created new and growing spaces and opportunities for potential actors on the ideologi-
cal stage and the construction of heterodox or competing sets of collective identities beyond 
the control of the CCP. In this context the introduction of the Internet as a global medium 
with its inherent capabilities of facilitating the free flow of ideas and many-to-many com-
munication to China is widely believed to have added one of the greatest challenges to the 
current one-party rule in the People’s Republic of China. There is, however, so far hardly 
any empirical evidence for this hypothesis and a second group of observers believes the 
Chinese Internet to be an instrument of oppression and ideological control. Hence the two 
core questions to be addressed in this paper are: Does the Internet in the PRC provide ven-
ues for heterodox discourses on national identity or the construction of alternative collective 
identities? If there is empirical evidence for competing identities, do they constitute a serious 
challenge to the Communist Party and its rule?  
Following this introduction and the necessary notes on research context and methodology I 
give a brief overview on the state of Internet development in the PRC. I put emphasis on 
several specifically Chinese characteristics, namely the Chineseness of the medium and the 
matchless popularity services for interpersonal many-to-many communication enjoy among 
Chinese netizens. By adapting Oldenburg’s theoretical concept of Third Places I then intro-
duce the central idea of communication forums as imagined places for community building, 
which are embedded in offline social reality and together with places in the physical world 
form a new virreal spatial continuum for interpersonal social interaction and the independ-
ent construction of collective identities. The following chapter examines the central issue of 
national identity as one major collective identity based on shared imaginations of and di-
rectly tied to territory – or place. Here I discuss empirical findings, which suggest that na-
tionalism as created by the party – though without competing alternative yet – constitutes a 
rather abstract concept needing strong stimuli in order to be invoked and otherwise lacking 
strong cohesive power. In the next chapter I contrast national identity with place-based col-
lective identities on the local level. Providing empirical evidence from Internet communica-
tion and field work in China I argue that models of identification tied to localities, which can 
be directly experienced on a daily basis, possess stronger cohesive power and the potential 
for agency national identity is widely lacking. Hence I conclude in the final part that chal-
lenges for one-party rule in China will not accrue from heterodox models of national identi-
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fication but rather from widespread negligence in this respect among the younger strata of 
society. The existing political balance of power, I argue, will not be challenged on the na-
tional level but by growing self-awareness of privileged social groups and identity construc-
tion based on both mutual interests and locality.  
 
 
2. Research Context and Methodology 
This article is part and result of a larger research project on identity construction on the Chi-
nese Internet. Inspired by the open and circular research design of Grounded Theory ap-
proaches (Strauss 1994; Strauss and Corbin 1996; differently Glaser 1992) a research team has 
analyzed communication within several popular bulletin boards for a period of more than 
two years by applying qualitative sociological and ethnographic research tools that had in 
part to be developed for the purpose of conducting this research.2  
So far, if Chinese bulletin boards were subject of academic research at all, authors have 
largely limited their attention to the famous Strong Country Forum (qiangguo luntan) main-
tained by the Party paper People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao) (cf. Li et al. 2003). This BBS, how-
ever, is exceptional in a number of ways, not representative for the situation in general, and 
therefore had not been included in this study. In contrast to the Strong Country Forum the 
large majority of Chinese BBS does not have any political focus. They rather concentrate on 
lifestyle issues, entertainment, popular culture etc. and serve as platforms for exchanging 
information, news and opinions on a very wide range of topics, covering virtually all aspects 
of modern urban mainstream and even beyond. Although different from the non-
representative conversations of the exceptional Strong Country Forum, communication 
within virtually all the other forums is nonetheless by far not apolitical. 
Following several months of monitoring more than 60 communication forums we selected 
the four Chinese bulletin boards Youth Topics (cf. cyol 2002), Fashion, Eating, Living, Motion 
(cf. sina 2002), Camp Emotion, Online Romance (cf. sohu 2002a) and Social Aspects, Exploring 
Culture (cf. sohu 2002b) for in-depth analysis (detailed in Giese 2005d). These communica-
tion forums formally covered areas such as lifestyle, love and partnership as well as social, 
cultural and political issues. Although formally concentrating on certain topical fields, the 
actual contents were not at all limited to these predefined fields but rather covered a very 
                                                     
2  For a more detailed discussion of theoretical concepts and the methodology employed in this re-
search project, please compare Giese (2005d). I am indebted to my colleagues Britta Uihlein, Chin-
Feng Teng, Julia Welsch, Shi Ming, Alexandra Dziuba and Pan Ching-ching who participated in 
this research project. Without their efforts and individual contributions at different stages of re-
search this project would not have been the success it became. 
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wide range of topics and virtually all the issues that had to be regarded of broader interest in 
China during the time of observation.  
Because the existence of a considerable amount of identity-related communication was one 
of the criteria for the selection of the BBS, the selection process was also used for preliminary 
explorations of possible categories through participant observation and the testing of suit-
able research methods for analyzing textual data. Potentially relevant dimensions of social 
identity reflected within BBS conversations were explored by taking the so-called Identity 
Family (Glaser 1978) as a starting point. Because indicators for dimensions of identity were 
more often than not – often unintentionally – hidden between the lines of identity-unrelated 
conversations as latent structures of meaning (Oevermann et al. 1979, 1987), sequential 
analysis as core method of Objective Hermeneutics was employed in order to reconstruct 
the relevant dimensions. Only main or peripheral statements should be recorded and classi-
fied respectively that contained semantic implications of first or second order. I.e. only indi-
cators were to be encoded, which could be easily reconstructed from the recorded quotation 
when cross-checked by a second researcher possessing adequate phenomenon-related 
knowledge (cf. table 1). This open construction of categories (see Strauss 1994: 37ff., 58; 
Strauss/Corbin 1996: 43f.) led by basic or general knowledge (cf. Popper 1974: 85ff.; Früh 
2001) resulted in dimensions – national identity and place-based identity being major ones – 
relevant to the research objective and made up the basis for the following in-depth analysis.3 
 
Table 1: Example for encoding and interpretation of text sequences 
thread topic leaving the BBS 
author Eldest Female Disciple 007 
quotation 
It’s just going back to the earlier peace and harmony of caring for the husband 
and educating the child, washing clothes and cooking, teaching and writing, 
earning money for the family4 
argument central 
intention neutral/expressive 
dimension gender 
ascription self-ascribed 
interpretation caring for a family is the destined role for a woman 
                                                     
3  The relevant dimensions of individual and collective identities, which were identified through 
open coding are: individual, gender, age group, ethnicity, culture, nation, locality, religion and 
ideology, political institution, socio-economical strata, formal and informal group. These di-
mensions constituted the systematic categories for further analysis (cf. Giese 2005d). 
4  In the original data bank the quotations were recorded in Chinese and not translated in order to 
avoid distortions by potentially interpretative translation. 
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In-depth analysis of communication was conducted by – normally a contradiction in itself – 
reconciling Objective Hermeneutics (Oevermann et al. 1979, 1987) with Qualitative Content 
Analysis (see Mayring 2000) during a six months period from May to October 20025. By ap-
plying the technique of sequential analysis described above two German-Chinese research 
teams surveyed the whole written conversation of the four BBS chosen as samples. In con-
trast to the extremely time consuming and labor intensive in-depth sequential analysis of 
Objective Hermeneutics, however, the data were searched for explicit and latent manifesta-
tions of the dimensions of identity established during the previous process of theoretical 
sampling. Quotations were to be encoded accordingly and to be interpreted on a relatively 
low level of aggregation. Due to the huge amount of empirical data – more than 98,600 indi-
vidual postings by more than 11,400 authors within six months – specific rules for reducing 
the size of the sample were employed considering the discursive nature of identity construc-
tion. In order to further enhance the reliability and inter-subjectivity (i.e. triangulation) the 
interpretation process was carried out according to a discursive system of up to three stages 
of checks and cross-checks. Rather aiming at painting a general picture than focusing on 
single cases with questionable potential for generalization all the resulting approximately 
8,000 sets of valid interpretations have then been transformed into a higher aggregated form 
by encoding in more universal and abstract concepts but preserving the original wording of 
textual sources as far as possible. 
After theoretical saturation had been reached in the course of the online survey, findings 
were to be evaluated by an additional offline survey in China. Samples and methods were 
chosen on the basis of the provisional interpretations derived from online sampling and 
adapted to the double aim of 1) identifying manifestations of the dimensions found to be 
core elements within the construction and (re-)negotiation of social and collective identities 
in Chinese BBS, and 2) evaluating our interpretations for potential generalizations and, fur-
thermore, possibly exploring dimensions not yet identified. Regarding research instruments 
as well as localities and target groups for the fieldwork, the approach once again was a 
mixed strategy combining inductive with deductive elements. Considering diversity in re-
gard of geographic setting, regional culture, political function, stage of economic develop-
ment, and dynamic of Internet penetration Beijing, Shanghai and Chengdu were identified 
as distinct regional urban centers and very suitable localities for parallel offline surveys. 
Featuring distinctly different characteristics, it was assumed that it should be possible to 
                                                     
5  Analysis covered all threads that were started within this period but in a larger number of cases 
lasted much longer, sometimes until March or even May 2003. All threads and individual postings 
have been downloaded and archived. These archives have been made available online for facilitat-
ing further research (cf. BBS Youth Topics 2002a; BBS Fashion, Eating, Living, Motion 2002a; BBS 
Exploring Culture 2002a; BBS Online Romance 2002). 
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find evidence for either strong regional influences on identity construction and resulting in 
distinct differences or – in case of largely corresponding findings – potential generalizations 
regarding common dimensions of Chinese identities. Following Denzin’s (1989: 236ff.) ap-
proach for triangulation data- as well as observer-triangulation was realized, i.e. participant 
observation including accompanying interviews as well as additional analyses of artifacts 
and visual data was carried out in several observation sites in each of the chosen cities and 
observation was designed to be conducted by more than one researcher at the same time 
and each followed by systematically cross checking preliminary interpretations via interper-
sonal discourse. 
Due to the methodology employed in the larger research project the arguments presented in 
this paper have to be viewed as highly aggregated results of a very complex process of dis-
cursive interpretation, which makes the usual way of providing references impossible. I 
have, however, included supporting quotations from the original Chinese source material as 
illustrations (see threads 1-28)6. These representative examples hopefully will enable the 
reader to relate to the interpretations presented in this paper. Moreover, if I will make use of 
quantifying formulations while presenting research results in the following passages, these 
should be viewed not as results of quantifying methods and counting but rather as qualify-
ing statements and views that have been identified as clearly dominating the discourses 
within the empirical source material. Furthermore, if correlations between statements and 
views with specific groups (age, social positioning etc.) are presented, these are generally 
based on additional data collected on individual authors and groups of participants for 
whom their self-representation and reactions thereon by other authors provided clear and 
reliable cues for grouping them by age group, socio-economic positioning, and place of ori-
gin or abode respectively. If arguments ground on field work in physical places in China, 
this will be indicated within the text. The same applies to interpretations that have been 
reached by including additional Chinese media sources. 
                                                     
6  The author has made efforts to preserve the original nature of the quoted individual postings and 
threads by replicating the structure, accompanying emoticons etc. In the same way, non-idiomatic 
Chinese and inadequate grammar or usage of terms within the Chinese originals have been pre-
served by recreating similar patterns in the English translations. Single letters, words or phrases 
printed in Italics in the quotations indicate that Latin letters or English words have been used in 
the original Chinese language material. Omitted phrases within postings are indicated by “(…)”, 
omitted postings within a thread by “…”, while necessary additions are indicated by square 
brackets “[ ]”. 
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3. Global or National? Internet with Chinese Characteristics 
In the Chinese political context the Internet has been envisioned as either liberating weapon 
of the weak empowering the people versus the government or powerful tool in the hands of 
the ruling party for intensifying political and social control (cf. i.a. RSF 2003, 2004; 
Kalathil/Boas 2003; Mooney 2004; Wong 2003; Hachigan 2001). The truth, however, is much 
more complex than either the utopian or the dystopian extreme may suggest, and is, more-
over, not easy to discern. The often highly deterministic arguments exchanged between both 
the proponents of technology-driven liberalization and democratization on one hand and 
those who predict the CPC’s capacity to control and suppress the democracy-seeking masses 
will even grow with the invention of networked technologies on the other hand are reflect-
ing hopes, fears, and ideologies of the respective individual or collective proponents rather 
than providing a balanced account of Chinese reality7. I fully agree with my German col-
league Gudrun Wacker who concluded that 
“The common practice of conducting activities under the cloak of pseudonyms in Chi-
nese cyberspace and the relative weakness of ‘virtual’ sanctions might still make the 
Internet more of a catalyst of social change than other media, but it is most likely to 
play a significant role if a social or political movement emerges in the non-virtual 
world. (…)The Internet might ignore territorial boundaries or surmount them without 
much effort (although even this has begun to change), but this does not mean that it 
exists in a social and political vacuum, detached and independent of its environment.” 
(Wacker 2003: 73). 
In the same way as Wacker advocates an approach that takes into account the social and 
political reality in which Internet usage is always embedded and rooted, any one-sided in-
terpretation from the distance, may this be dystopian or utopian, certainly also falls short of 
reflecting the actual experiences of the average Chinese Internet user himself/herself. At this 
point I dare to say that for the majority of users in China daily Internet routine probably 
appears far less spectacular than numerous rather sensational accounts within the Western 
mass and academic media may suggest (see also Kalathil/Boas 2003; Tsui 2001). In order to 
assess the role the Internet plays today and may potentially play in the course of the socio-
political development of the PRC it is of utmost importance to shed some light on the way in 
which the by now more than 100 million Chinese users themselves actually experience their 
Internet.  
First of all, the Chinese Internet today is by no means an international or global medium but 
an almost exclusively Chinese one. This Chineseness of the Internet experience in China is 
                                                     
7  For a general discussion of politically induced constraints to online behaviour in the PRC, which 
lies beyond the scope of this paper, cf. Giese 2005b: 30ff., 2005c. 
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reflected not only by the huge amount of locally produced content but also by the fact that 
82.6 per cent of the Chinese Internet users surveyed by CNNIC in late 2004 convincingly 
stated they exclusively accessed and viewed domestic Chinese websites – mostly commer-
cial with content catering to the particular needs and tastes of users in the PRC (CNNIC 
2005: 19f.; cf. Jiang 2004: 4f.; Giese 2005b: 22). Moreover, Internet experience is by far not 
universal or evenly spread within China, since high degrees of Internet adoption within 
highly urbanized regions of Eastern China clearly indicate that Internet usage is predomi-
nantly an urban phenomenon (cf. CNNIC 2004: 4f.; Burkholder 2005). As Chinese Internet 
researcher Guo Liang put it earlier, 
“in social reality, people at the top of the social ladder can set foot more easily into vir-
tual space. (…) Therefore, we can predict that the Internet’s effects on China will not 
be the same at each social level, but rather will be a process originating in the upper-
middle classes.” (Guo 2003: 14). 
Regarding these strata of the Chinese population, however, duration and frequency of 
weekly usage (CNNIC 2004: 12; Guo 2003a: 19ff., 22ff.) strongly suggest that for a significant 
proportion of young and well educated middle class Chinese urbanites Internet usage has 
become an important leisure activity already deeply integrated with their daily routines. 
Among the dominating entertainment functions provided by the medium it is clearly the 
communicative aspects and services that are most appealing to Chinese Internet users. 
Asked for the services they used most frequently 34 to 39 per cent of the surveyed favored 
online chat most, and around 18 to 19 per cent quoted Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) to be 
their favorite activity (CNNIC 2004: 13; Guo 2003a: 26). The results of the CASS survey on 
Internet usage in selected Chinese cities reveal that almost 60 per cent of the interviewees 
have used BBS at least sometimes (Guo 2003a: 87). 
 
 
4. Chinese Bulletin Boards – Popular Places for Community Building 
Although a medium of mass communication in its own right, metaphors, however, of 
space/place/locality and community have clearly dominated much of the discourse on Inter-
net and its various services and functions. And for many users too, the Internet is as Hardey 
(2002) suggests “just a different space where they may meet others and make use of a vast 
number of services and resources”. Internet or cyberspace in general, though neither a place 
nor a fixed space in the common sense (Sant 2001), can, however, be described as a space of 
sheer countless interlinked virtual or imagined places where you can “interact with other hu-
man beings without actually being in physical proximity” (Fletcher 1998). A concept that 
goes beyond this by including technologically mediated psychological proximity, defines 
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this imagination, which is – in technical terms – created by architecting an online site, as 
network locality, if this place “grounds a diffuse form of affiliation and enables an intentional 
community” (Ito 1999: 12). As surveys show, this theoretical approach corresponds with the 
way the Chinese users perceive their Internet. Almost half of the Internet users interviewed 
by CASS envisioned the whole Internet as a meeting place (Guo 2003a: 1). 
It is not hard to imagine that affiliation and proximity do not in the first place evolve from 
an abstract locality in the form of a particular website itself, but from the people meeting 
there and building communities tied to locality, grounded and driven by the force of certain 
shared imaginings (Ito 1999: 12). Numerous ethnographic and sociological studies have 
shown that localities in cyberspace are conducive to community building – basically by fa-
cilitating many-to-many communication (see i.a. Bruckman 1992; Reid 1994, 1995; Turkle 
1995; Cogdill 1996a; Breeze 1997; Ito 1999; Wellman/Gulia 1999; Rheingold 1994; Sant 2001). 
The Bulletin Board Systems so popular with Chinese Internet users and omnipresent on the 
Chinese web certainly are services providing virtual or imagined localities that – ideally – 
connect people so that they can feel to be part of a community they build themselves simply 
by participating in online conversation for some time. In this way Chinese BBS are localities 
where communities are built out of the conversation and celebrated within the conversation 
at the same time. In other words, Chinese BBS as well as other online communication fo-
rums elsewhere (Wellman/Gulia 1999: 185-188; Sant 2001; Horrigan 2001: 11), fit into the 
picture Ray Oldenburg (1989/1999) has elaborated of the informal social gathering places he 
calls Great Good Places or Third Places.  
These third places according to Oldenburg (1999: 16, 42) are – in contrast to family and work 
place as first and second places – core settings of informal public life. In this way, the café or 
coffeehouse is probably most often referred to as a third place. And although Oldenburg 
strictly confined his concept to physical interaction and explicitly dismissed the idea of vir-
tual third places as escapism, for many younger Chinese these forums filled an existing vac-
uum in the physical world of Chinese cities when they were invented and – though not ex-
isting as physical localities – have created urban places of a new quality.8 
Concentrating on Chinese Bulletin Board Systems these forums are best imagined as gather-
ing places for socializing, informal places in a neighborhood, a street corner café, a pub etc. 
located in the case of a BBS, in a virtual environment created by the website it is located on. 
Like in offline environments you will make a first visit to take a peek and give it a try, and if 
                                                     
8  Physical public places only very recently became a relevant issue for Chinese urban planners and 
architects who previously have been rather obsessed with creating impressive skylines and mo-
torways but largely neglected functions of everyday urban life such as public places at the core of 
social life (cf. ABC 2005). 
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you feel comfortable with the place (accessibility, visual appearance, convenience, pro-
gramming) and the people (nicknames, netiquette, content of conversation) patronizing the 
locality, you will come back to take a closer look and then, eventually, leave forever or de-
cide to make the place one of your favorite hangouts for interpersonal communication and 
social interaction. 
Since these hangouts on the Chinese Internet generally boast a rather informal and playful 
atmosphere, they also seem to be most conducive to discussing and debating sensitive or 
controversial topics. Supported by pseudonymity people feel at ease here to reveal or test 
even very unconventional or politically daring attitudes and views without having to fear 
potentially severe sanctions in the physical world. Hence, a wide range of topics is discussed 
in Chinese BBS, and many conflicting viewpoints are voiced, often as heterogeneous as the 
range of topics itself. Online communication forums, however, as said before do not exist in 
a vacuum. They are deeply rooted in the social reality of the offline world and in the indi-
vidual experiences the participants accumulate while living in distinct physical places in 
today’s urban China (Giese 2003a: 201f., 207f.; cf. Wellma/Gulia 1999: 170).  
Within the Chinese BBS, which constitute virtual places, we find a huge number of hints 
pointing to both these distinct physical places the participants live in and themselves as in-
dividuals of flesh and blood in the physical world. Of many participants at least sex, ap-
proximate age, profession and socio-economic positioning is commonly known. Sometimes 
detailed and intimate personal information is voluntarily disclosed by individual BBS users. 
This information, however, is in most cases selective. Authenticity of the virtual persona and 
her behavior seems to be more important than full information on the real world person 
behind the nickname. Whereas social relationships in physical places are founded on trust 
that is built over time, trust in the virtual place called BBS is more closely associated with 
authenticity and thus predictability of behavior (see e.g. Orthmann 2004: 20f.; Donath 
1999: 55; Burkhalter 1999; O’Brien 1999). But although the majority of participants still has to 
rely on intuition and cues when judging each other online, offline contacts and gatherings, 
which are already not uncommon in the Chinese context, seem to increase over the years. 
Chinese netizens, although they are free to hide behind pseudonymity, rather often choose 
not to do so, as social interaction in a given virtual third place grows more regular and social 
ties closer and eventually expand into the physical world (see also Yang 2003: 418). 
Summing up, most Chinese Bulletin Boards have to be regarded as imagined localities – i.e. 
places – where real people meet for experiencing community and exchanging emotions and 
opinions closely related to their offline social environment and directly reflecting their ex-
periences as real persons (cf. Rheingold 1994; Codgill 1996a, 1996b; Horrigan 2001). This 
feature of offline experiences transcending online behavior, however, is no one-way street, 
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since “all that is virtual bleeds into reality” (Fletcher 1998), also influencing people’s percep-
tion of reality and behavior in physical places – at least potentially. BBS as imagined places 
in virtual space hence have to be regarded as parts of a larger social, political and cultural 
space they are embedded in, together forming new virreal places for interdependent and 
interlinked social (inter)action and last not least the construction of collective identities. 
If assuming that individual and collective identities are generally socially constructed in a 
reciprocal way (cf. i.a. Butler 1990: 33; Baker 2001: 3f.; Bourdieu 1993; Boyd 2002), verbal 
interaction in these virtual places and virreal spaces can be regarded as discourses on iden-
tity or at least related to identity, although the actors themselves might not be aware of this 
fact. As collective identities interlink individuals, they provide security through a shared 
sense of we-ness based on shared (imagined) attributes in contrast to others. The main fea-
ture of collective identities, however, is the provision of meaning based on faith and emo-
tional bonding (cf. Schöpflin 2001; Bourdieu 1993; Lear 1998). The link between individual 
and collective identity is realized via communication, and both individuals and collectivities 
are engaged in reciprocal discursive construction of identity, a process that includes negotia-
tion of both core issues and demarcation – often in contrast to the ‘other’. Discourses of col-
lective identities are multidimensional and fragmented (cf. Melucci et al. 1989; Jasper & 
Polletta 2001), a fact that leaves room for innovation within existing collectives but also for 
conflicting alternatives to hegemony and orthodoxy to emerge (Schöpflin 2001). Based on 
moral propositions collective identities generally can be regarded to regulate orientations, 
values and behavior of their members and bear the potential for agency (cf. Castells 1997; 
Snow 2001). The shared sense of we and a common cause can be motivating to act together 
in the interests of (imagined) collectivities. 
The Chinese Party state itself has made great efforts in identity work, and the creation of a 
modern Chinese national identity under the guidance of the Chinese Communist Party is 
centerpiece of these efforts, but by far not the only one. Before this background unguided 
discourses such as in bulletin boards of the Chinese Internet – although efforts to manipulate 
communication are under way at least in the more popular and political forums – possess 
the potential to undermine the Party state’s efforts in constructing and continuously rein-
forcing own models of identification. The rather organic nature of the construction of indi-
vidual and collective identities within these imagined places might furthermore challenge 
the Party state’s capacity to enforce its citizens’ compliance in both the virtual and the physi-
cal world, particularly if a feeling of agency emerged and were added to alternative collec-
tive identities. Hence the crucial question is whether alternative models within existing col-
lective identities and newly emerging collective identities with their capacity to regulate 
behavior show the potential to challenge hegemonic discourses and, by creating heterodoxy 
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and a sense of agency, may pose a threat to the extant power balance. Although the con-
struction of a considerable variety of collective identities can be observed within virreal 
places, the scope of this paper is limited to the macro and the micro level on which such 
identities are constructed and performed: The national and (sub-)local dimensions of collec-
tive identification both form relevant fields for potential political conflict. 
 
 
5. Withering National Identity 
The CCP realized that a unified national identity – a construct – can serve as powerful tool 
for social and political integration (cf. Seckington 2005: 25f.). Originally initiated during the 
early 1980s by Chinese intellectuals in search of new and distinctively Chinese modernity, 
this discourse quickly moved center stage within the CCP’s efforts for legitimizing the per-
petuation of its autocrat rule (cf. Lackner 1998). Retreating more and more from the ortho-
dox Chinese communist ideology the party defined its new role as nationalistic party of 
modernization (cf. Heberer 1997) and hence has dominated the Chinese discourse on na-
tional character, modern Chinese identity and national culture (cf. Geist 1996). In this way 
exercising and maintaining political power has become directly related to the capacity to 
control relevant discourses within the Chinese society. However, from the beginning of this 
project in the 1980s there have always also been dissenting voices and efforts to create alter-
native models of identification, as for instance the intellectual debates in the field of Chinese 
literature showed (Geist 1996). And of course, the 1989 movement led by students clearly 
also was a strong manifestation of such dissent and heterodoxy. Last not least, this was indi-
cated by the widespread public controversy over the Chinese TV documentation He Shang 
(River Elegy), which developed not least before the background of struggles for personal 
power and political directions within the CCP itself (Cui 1988; Peschel 1991).  
Generally speaking Chineseness or Chinese national identity seems to have two dominant 
dimensions, a pseudo-biological racist one and a more modern political one. Although the 
Party state has emphasized both in its construction of national identity, it is particularly the 
political dimension that might backfire at party and government when being subjected to 
unguided discourses in virreal places. Politically there seems to be virtually no-one in the 
many virtual places of the PRC who does not positively, though in a rather abstract way, 
identify as citizen of this country. National identity however seems to be not at all tied to the 
leading role of the ruling party as intended by the Party state. On the contrary, discourses in 
virtual places show a widespread tendency towards constructing alternative models of identi-
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fication that potentially compete with CCP orthodoxy. The following excerpts (threads 1, 2, 15) 
are representative examples for this tendency. 
 
Thread 1 
 Eastern Wood Arrogant, perfidious, shameless, and egoistic Japanese 26.10.2002 12:21 
(…)9 I do not deny that there are more traitors to our country than in any other country in 
the world, but that’s because no other country in the world has a larger population than 
China. I do not deny that there do exist a lot of problems in regard of corruption within 
the government, but we should not forget how the Chinese satellites were positioned up 
in the sky, how the explosion of the nuclear bomb was achieved, and how the Chinese 
have become rich after the reforms and opening. No matter which period, there have al-
ways been a number of outstanding persons in China who have been standing on the 
leading edge of social development. These persons are the pillars of China.  
(BBS Youth Topics 2002b) 
 
Thread 2 
 wangluotuzi There are a lot of problems but there is also a bright future! 28.06.2002 11:02 
China is lacking clear-sighted leaders, but the Chinese people are industrious, intelligent, 
brave, and prudent; our ancestors were brilliant. No other nation possesses these [strong 
points]. We should be confident that China will have a bright future,  
(BBS Youth Topics 2002c) 
 
But national identity also seems to provide individuals with a rather latent channel for iden-
tification with a larger collective. In everyday life it is bearing relevance only for social strata 
that regard themselves as politically active intellectuals. The average Chinese does not seem 
to be particularly interested in reflecting upon the own nation or national identity, and there 
seems to be no sense of inherent agency, as well. This not least suggests the low level of par-
ticipation debates within the Chinese bulletin boards under observation, which directly ad-
dress related issues. Like in many countries the Chinese national teams’ performances in 
international sports competitions such as the Olympics or the Football World Cup are an 
issue of national pride and identification. In this way they also give reason for developing a 
– rather short-lived – kind of agency (cf. thread 3). 
 
                                                     
9  See footnote 6. 
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Thread 3 
pongkey Today the Chinese national soccer team lost a match but did not loose face 
08.06.2002 21:16  
Reflecting Snow in June pongkey, you’re completely right :))) 08.06.2002 21:26  
There is still a long way to go for Chinese soccer.  
We Chinese should still enthusiastically and passionately all-out support ~~~~  
pongkey Hee hee, should China win over Brasil, snow in June will also be possible 
^O^ 08.06.2002 21:35  
Reflecting Snow in June Hee hee hee hee hee hee~~~~~~~~~~~~ 08.06.2002 21:55 
Really would like to see snow in June :)))))))) 
(BBS Fashion, Eating, Living, Motion 2002b) 
 
Generally speaking, conceptions of the Chinese nation and national identity are almost ex-
clusively voiced as reactions towards anniversaries of painful historical events closely re-
lated to the arch enemy Japan, namely the Nanjing Massacre, the so called May 30 Massa-
cre10, the victorious end of the Chinese War of Resistance etc. – and triggered by specific 
media reports for instance on visits to the Yasukuni shrine by a Japanese prime minister, the 
introduction of biased Japanese school books and so on. The following representative quota-
tions from the studied BBS illustrate this phenomenon. They also demonstrate the wide-
spread irrelevance for the individual (thread 5), the general lack of agency, the indifference 
towards the national cause, and also the ambiguity of anti-Japanese nationalism and na-
tional identity based on historic experiences even the most agitated of the participants dem-
onstrate in their statements (thread 6). 
 
Thread 4 
 Arrogantly Looking Down Upon A Number Of Heroes Why don’t we get enraged? 
10.09.2002 23:36 
(…) September 18 is near, compatriots, prepare your rage and make the Japanese bastards 
know that we’ll never forget history and never will forget the pain. 
I, Arrogantly Looking Down Upon A Number Of Heroes, hope that those who share my feel-
ings will join hands and preserve our dignity! My ICQ ID is 24903389, email 
czw9876@sina.com.cn  
(BBS Exploring Culture 2002b) 
                                                     
10  This is an interesting example in its own right. During anti-Japanese protests British police killed a 
dozen Chinese civilians. Only recently the Shanghai municipal government erected a huge memo-
rial at the west end of Nanjing East Road. The people, however, occupied this piece of land for 
their own private purposes: couples stretch on the lawn, children play and climb on he monument 
etc. – practices that definitely can not be regarded by the Chinese government as adequate behav-
iour in such a place but obviously tolerated by local authorities. 
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Thread 5 
 Small Lascivious Immortal A Problem that is not easy to ignore 20.09.2002 10:41 
[On the occasion of] 9.11 a female student of Beijing Normal University offered flowers to 
the American embashit, [but] how many people offer flowers to war victims or the mar-
tyrs of the revolution on September 18? Think about this, all of you! 
(BBS Exploring Culture 2002c) 
 
Thread 6 
 Though Getting Wet By The Rain … Fucking Japanese ———— 25.10.2002 10:22 
(…) it’s because I watched a documentary on the Nanjing Massacre, September 18, on the 
web. Even before, there was no space in my mind for any different image of the Japanese, 
only cruelty and abominableness. (…)  
Japan had become a model for us, and many Chinese students, like the masters of mod-
ern literature Lu Xun and Guo Moruo, went to Japan to study. Many of the leading offi-
cers of the Guomindang also studied in Japan. At that time the notion was quite popular 
in China that the strong Western capitalist countries in America and Europe were the 
biggest enemies of China and neighboring Japan across a narrow stretch of water was our 
friend. 
This inevitably makes me thinking about the current state of Sino-Japanese affairs. Nine 
tenths of the young Japanese believe that the Nanjing Massacre is a lie, and more than 
half of them think Japan should take revenge for having been defeated by the Chinese in 
WW II. Almost every Japanese prime minister has visited the Yasukuni Shrine in order to 
invoke the souls of those who died in the name of militarism. The Japanese have occu-
pied our Diaoyu Islands and do not intend to return them. And what will our future 
bring? We are watching Japanese soap operas all day long, we are watching romantic 
love stories of Japanese men and women, we are dreaming, dreaming the dream of Sino-
Japanese friendship, and even believe that the Japanese a related to the Chinese by blood 
ties. Wake up! I do not oppose foreign cultural imports, I also do not oppose Japanese 
soaps and I even watch Japanese soaps myself like anybody else. I only want to remind 
our young friends not to forget September 18, not to forget the Nanjing Massacre, and not 
to forget unit 71311.  
(BBS Youth Topics 2002d) 
 
Public commemoration and exaggeration of historical national traumata by the state media 
seem to be most conducive to evoking and activating national and nationalistic sentiments 
paired with a vague sense of agency (cf. thread 4). However, the feeling of such collective 
agency inherent to national identity, sometimes resulting in extreme and also violent but 
largely symbolic action, all in all seems to be rather short-lived. The recent anti-Japanese 
                                                     
11  Even this author seems to be not too familiar with current Chinese history. The military unit he 
refers to actually is unit 731. Unit 731 was a secret military medical unit of the Imperial Japanese 
Army that researched biological warfare and other topics through human experimentation in 
North-East China during the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) and World War II era. 
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demonstrations in virtually all major Chinese cities are a good example. The demonstrators 
took to the streets only after 1) the Chinese media reported on Japanese schoolbooks that 
were allegedly distorting history, 2) a campaign against a permanent seat in the UN Security 
council for Japan was launched on major Chinese Internet portals, 3) discussions had be-
come almost omnipresent in virtual places connecting both issues with the Japanese legacy 
from WW2 in general (Giese 2005a: 3f.) and 4) widespread calls for demonstrations ap-
peared in almost every Internet forum. Heated debates in virtual places drew even more 
people into physical places in a second wave of demonstrations. If one were cynical, both 
verbal anti-Japanese activism in virtual and action against physical manifestations of the 
Japanese in physical places could be regarded as “extreme leisure activities” in a virreal spa-
tial continuum driven by nationalism, since online discussions generally took place in the 
off-hours and demonstrations on weekends ending abruptly shortly before dinner time. Fur-
thermore, even most Chinese observers – though not in public statements – agree that these 
demonstrations have to be regarded more as a rare opportunity for uninhibited individual 
and collective behavior in the public the urban youth and the white collar workers have 
widely made use of for letting of steam (Giese 2005e). The interlinkage and interdependence 
of virtual and physical places is further demonstrated by the fact that state authorities 
successfully approached potential protestors in both the virtual and the physical places and 
issued warnings against further demonstrations through traditional media channels, via 
short message service, websites and in bulletin boards in order to put an end to the demon-
strations in the physical world (Giese 2005a: 7f.). 
Even such situatively induced upsurges of strong national sentiments do, however, not only 
demonstrate a shared imagination of being Chinese or a general agreement with the national 
imagination purposefully constructed by the Party state, but rather possess considerable 
potential for heterodoxy. Quite often, this Chinese nationalism, activated by exogenous 
stimuli, mutates into a collective feeling of opposition against government, CCP and their 
representatives. Historical injuries China suffered from the imperialistic powers of the past 
are still constitutive for the mixed feelings towards the own nation today. The Chinese psy-
che – though there has developed a strong collective feeling to be on the way to be a strong 
power step by step regaining the once leading position – still seems do be dominated by the 
strong feeling of temporary inferiority and vulnerability as a nation and – as a direct result – 
the need for self-strengthening efforts in order not to be pushed around anymore in the fu-
ture. This widely perceived current state of vulnerability is, for instance, held responsible for 
the search of good relations with the Japanese arch enemy and the necessity for demonstrat-
ing the degree of good will China is currently showing to its Asian neighbors in general (see 
thread 7).  
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Thread 7 
 Year Of the Horse [I] know that China is not yet rich and powerful, that’s 09.10.2002 
07:51 
the reason why we need to cultivate good relations with our neighbors; in order to ac-
quire still more technologies, and to save military expenses. 
Pseudo-patriots like you, in their self-adulation craze, will only spoil everything. [What 
you suggest is] nothing but a short-lived acting out of rowdiness. 
[We] have discussed for such a long time now, and you still do not realize that you are 
behaving ridiculously?  
Once again, do you want your girlfriend to wear a Taliban chador? 
(BBS Youth Topics 2002d) 
 
Hence, there is further consensus that both China has to rise, has in part risen already and 
will rise to full strength again in the near future. There seems to be a general consensus 
among the different groups of the Chinese population that internal political and social defi-
ciencies largely based on historical traditions, mismanagement and abuse of power have to 
be held responsible for this largely home-made national weakness (see threads 8, 9).  
 
Thread 8 
 Bagong Mountain Man The real dangers that we face 20.07.2002 12:37 
(…) Today the greatest danger lies in the fact that the economy is growing rapidly and 
society is changing radically on the one hand and 99 percent of the people are barred 
from actively participating in the political life and the society of the country, and power is 
monopolized by a small group of people on the other. The lower social strata cast more 
and more doubts regarding the legality of power of those in power (although they might 
be unconscious of these doubts). In order to pull the ordinary masses together who eco-
nomically have become highly divided and who in political matters do not enjoy any 
freedom of speech, the mainstream media more and more radically employ the tradi-
tional ideologies of the central authorities, such as imperialism, anti-American thinking, 
rejection of democracy and value orientations of the West, stirring up hatred towards Ja-
pan, India and Taiwan, and revanchism as [social] glue. By doing so, the young genera-
tion will be educated to be ignorant, arrogant, and radical. If this becomes reality, then 
the catastrophe for China and the world will not be far.  
… 
 Voice Rich nation and rich people, that’s real patriotism (rich nation does not mean rich 
government) 14.10.2002 18:29  
The problem is that the masses are unable to fully benefit from the current economic 
construction. Of course dictatorship is not democratic; hence [you only can rely on] soli-
darity within your own circles. (…)  
(BBS Youth Topics 2002f) 
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Thread 9 
 Ever Persistent Dugu12 How much suffering has the severe and lingering disease corrup-
tion brought about China? How could this last for thousands of years until today and 
does not turn for the better? Should the historical inertia really be that strong?? 28.06.2002 
11:46 
Longing for the downfall of the corrupt party! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! (…) 
(BBS Youth Topics 2002g) 
 
Today the whole new wage-earning urban middle class is completely convinced of the po-
litical nature of the underlying causes for this perceived national weakness. Being most out-
spoken and critical, this group - which in fact was the main force behind the recent anti-
Japanese demonstrations – clearly holds the Communist Party and the Chinese government 
responsible for the unsatisfactory condition of the nation (see thread 8). Although the Chi-
nese government claims the political system to be socialist, this large group criticizes the 
current system to be dictatorial, producing corruption, hierarchies and exploitation in addi-
tion to prolonging existing backwardness and poverty. Due to a general lack of freedom, 
democracy and universal human rights, without radical change truth will be further sup-
pressed and widespread self-deception will prevail (see a.o. threads 8, 14, 15, 16, 25).  
Hence, the current state of national weakness and vulnerability would be prolonged indefi-
nitely, and China would be further treated with contempt by the powerful nations. Gener-
ally speaking, current national weakness is viewed as a result of internal political deficien-
cies under the rule of the CCP and the pointless leniency of the communist government to-
wards other competing nations, former aggressors in particular. The political leadership is 
generally viewed as incapable of making adequate use of the actual strength the nation has 
already acquired over the years. Hence, the rare incidents of Chinese politicians taking up a 
tough stance towards allegedly antagonistic nations are appreciated very much (see 
thread 10). 
 
Thread 10 
 I’m Old Yang Well then, Youngor13, since you cannot come to an end with your affirma-
tive mentioning of it, I will repost this posting that a senior fellow apprentice sent to my 
mailbox. Those of our compatriots who are living in Japan, you can discuss your impres-
sions of Japan yourselves. 27.11.2002 21:26 
(…) If our country did not enforce the suppression of Japan’s potential hostile attitude, 
and instead invariably propagated the shallow impression of “Sino-Japanese friendship, 
                                                     
12  Persiflage of “Nine Swords Dugu” (Dugu jiu jian), a character from the martial arts novel “Laugh-
ing in the Wind” (Xiao ao jianghu) by Jin Yong. 
13  Brand name of a major Chinese garment producer with headquarters in Ningbo. 
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the result inevitably will be that the young Chinese will develop a wrong understanding 
of the “Japanese nation”, will neglect their vigilance, and thoughtlessly tap into the trap 
of economic control the Japanese have set. 
The last time chairman *** visited Japan he provoked strong reactions among the Chinese 
living in Japan. Never before had we felt our back to be that strong. It was the first time 
within living memory that a Chinese prime leader so sternly condemned Japanese milita-
rism in public. How could this not be to the great joy of the people? Every place chairman 
Jiang went, he did not forget to address history. This left the Japanese unable to back 
down with good grace. This proves that China should not bow to other countries at the 
expense of justice. Developing the economy and standing up for justice are two entirely 
different things. 
(BBS Youth Topics 2002h) 
 
In such a situation, innumerable participants in many virtual places are convinced, loyalty to 
state and government should not be granted unconditionally; on the contrary, the govern-
ment has to earn loyalty of the citizens by treating them humanely, and the people in ex-
change should keep a watchful eye on their government (see threads 11, 12).  
 
Thread 11 
… 
 101 Native Dog We are drifting in the void, don’t know how this will end, don’t know 
where we come from, nor where we go, can only helplessly create new gods again and 
again for driving away the fear. 18.06.2002 02:29 
Mankind has learnt how to mutually rely on each other, how to survive in society and 
in a nation. They know how to reap the largest possible individual profits from the 
smallest possible investments. This means mankind opted for society and state; this 
has been a result of choice but not an obligation. In the same way patriotism is only a 
result of choice, as well.  
The state, just like a plough or a spoon, is only a tool that we created. Shall we forget 
about our own existence and make the aircraft-carriers and intelligent spacecrafts we 
developed our totems, only because we admire their sophistication and greatness?  
P8 was right; we should love the country like we would love a son. We transferred our 
own power to our state, and. its strength is so enormous and intimidating. Do we not 
have good reason to be frightened, as long as there is no similarly sophisticated and 
perfected controlling system to manage it and to remind it forever that it is still the 
slave of every single of its creators? If those in control usurped it and perverted the 
original creation, should we not resist this power or do we have no choice but still to 
love it “unconditionally”?  
Since it is that strong and has been taken possession of and turned against its own 
aims, we should protect ourselves against it like we prepare against robbers. 
 
We are drifting in the void, don’t know how this will end, don’t know where we come 
from nor where we go, can only helplessly create new gods again and again for bow-
ing to them in worship. 
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… 
 Swordsman Snow Patriotism is unconditional? 16.06.2002 11:26 
If so, why should we condemn the Nazis? They’re really patriotic, unconditionally pa-
triotic 
… 
(BBS Youth Topics 2002i) 
 
Thread 12 
 Vertical No single interest of the state can be superior to freedom and dignity of the peo-
ple 24.08.2002 22:49 
(BBS Youth Topics 2002j) 
 
On the other hand, both personal and universal human rights as well as spiritual guidance  
– but not necessarily also democracy – are very much in demand, not least from a virtuous 
government (cf. thread 13).  
 
Thread 13 
 Blue Cat Those people who are dying to propagate democracy 19.06.2002 18:43 
(…) The Chinese have no corporate feeling, they lack the notion of nationalism, they even 
very easily fight each other to the finish.  
Other people have religion, moral education, which restrain an individual’s conscience 
and behavior. But what do the Chinese have? (…) In such situation everybody can turn 
out to be a beast. 
(BBS Youth Topics k) 
 
Thread 14 
 Blue Cat You, Ordinary Joe 2002, are really substandard 19.06.2002 18:33 
The key points are equality and justice of society, and human rights; democracy is a dou-
ble-edged sword.  
Those people who habitually call for democracy are only sitting at home thinking.  
Never been face to face with those huge numbers of incurably poor quality Chinese …  
Not all the people are the same … The Chinese are masters in exploiting loopholes. The 
key issue is to cultivate the morality of the coming generations. There are too many 
among the ordinary people who have lowest moral standards. No moral values any-
where.  
Since Chinese are masters in exploiting loopholes, [you can imagine] in what state of 
chaos society would end, much more appalling than the degree of corruption today.  
Take the Chinese press for an example. Let’s assume press freedom was granted. Then, 
what if an underworld urchin menaced you, would you still dare to publish? Without 
safe environment, nothing will be achieved. It can only get worse 
(BBS Youth Topics 2002l) 
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Although the leading role of the Communist Party is rarely directly and openly challenged 
as long as it is the only political power with the capacity to safeguard national unity and a 
satisfying level of individual safety (cf. thread 14), the widespread discontent regarding the 
one-party system and the corruption, the denial of human rights like freedom of speech or 
the right of informational self-determination are creating the breeding ground for construct-
ing alternative forms of national identity independent from the Party state and potentially 
also in strong opposition to the CCP.  
 
Thread 15 
 Vertical I would have liked having been borne in Northwestern Europe. It’s a pity it 
didn’t work out like this, have to make the best of being a Chinese 17.06.2002 12:03 
Like to ask Katydid14 a question: Where has this signpost reading “Chinese and dogs are 
not allowed to enter” been mounted? At the gate of the park on the Bund or at the gate to 
freedom and human rights?  
(BBS Youth Topics 2002m) 
 
These common reservations indicate an evolving emancipation from the historical national-
ism and models of national identification constructed top-down by the CCP since 1989. They 
reflect a beginning alternative process of national identity construction that actually chal-
lenges the linking of national identity with loyalty not only to the party but also to the gov-
ernment (see thread 16; see also Guo 2004: 45). 
 
Thread 16 
 Flame Who says nobody is watching 06.09.2002 22:13 
Still would be the best without revolution, but if a revolution were to start no-one of us 
would be able to stop it.  
To give an example: When the Chinese go by public bus it’s always the same. Before they 
have entered the bus they press ahead and push those in front of them. “God damn, en-
ter, hurry up, go ahead.” Once they have entered the bus, they shout at those still outside. 
“What the hell are you pushing? There’s no more room inside.“ Just wait till those who 
are unable to enter the bus become too many. When they will start to make trouble, no-
body can go anywhere anymore. 
 
Go on developing „the economy“, build some more high-rises for showing off, and accel-
erate the catalysis. Perhaps it’s better to make trouble earlier than later. Have a big unrest. 
                                                     
14  Name of an insect in North America. It might also be a play of words. The Chinese two identical 
characters consist of two parts each that alone would read “chong” (insect) and “guo” (country). 
Read as a two-character word this would mean “insect country” but also sounds like a persiflage 
of China (= Zhongguo). In this way the nick name might be interpreted as a sigh: China, oh 
China…  
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It would be the best, if there were international intervention, deployment of international 
peacekeeping forces. If there even were a puppet government by grace of a Western 
country, it couldn’t come any better; we would welcome it. Maybe some problems even 
would be solved this way, 
(BBS Youth Topics 2002n) 
 
Taiwan is another test case for the effectiveness of state constructed unified national iden-
tity. Although national unity seems to be undisputed, even the issue of reunification with 
Taiwan so much emphasized by the Chinese government does not produce a sufficient feel-
ing of agency inherent to the Chinese national identity. Taiwan is simply not a prominent 
topic both online and offline. The Chinese government seems to be aware of this tendency 
and hence media coverage on this issue and the official condemnation of tendencies in Tai-
wan that might result in the island shifting away from the mainland and possibly resulting 
in the rejection of re-unification and the unity of the Chinese nation is left almost exclusively 
to CCTV 4, the television channel targeting at overseas Chinese audiences. Only on CCTV 4 
the warning can be heard on an almost daily basis, that the PRC might be forced to consider 
the use of military force against the island in order to realize and safeguard national unity 
(Giese 2003b).  
There is, no doubt, a widespread fascination for military matters and modern weapon sys-
tems in particular among the male population. This is well reflected by the large range of 
special interest magazines on sale in the streets of big Chinese cities: “Military Affairs Ob-
server”, “Straits Military Conflict” and “Military Display” are only a few examples of such 
magazines, which – by the way – all repeatedly address the military option for solving the 
Taiwan issue. There is, however, also huge regional variation between the cities under ob-
servation. Whereas the selection of such print products is quite small in Shanghai and not 
large in Beijing as well, Chengdu seems to be a major market. This doubtlessly is strongly 
influenced by the large military presence in this city hosting the headquarters of the Central 
Military District and several military departments offering specialized courses of study 
within the city’s universities (Giese 2003b). On a national basis, however, this does not find 
any big echo within the general public online, and the majority of voices reflecting on this 
topic in virtual places put the military option in question regarding both the price to be paid 
and humanitarian issues. The following excerpts from a thread (see thread 17), which was 
maintained for more than one month, clearly mirror this widespread opposition against any 
military solution of the Taiwan question and give a good impression of the nature of the 
discourse. 
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Thread 17 
… 
 Li San Is Coming Warmongers, both of you. This time I caught you red-handed. Confess 
17.08.2002 22:21  
1. If there were a war, would you volunteer? Not that the two of you, once the flame of 
war will be ignited, hunker down and bawl: Attack!  
2. How now? War has to be fought, even if the earth will be scorched? Is this your 
earth? You just want it to be scorched earth and it will be scorched? Damn it! You do not 
even own the smallest piece of earth; what right do you have to let theirs become 
scorched earth?  
3. How now? Recapturing actually means recapturing [territory] from the hands of an-
other county. It’s still the Taiwanese who are living on the Taiwan soil; what right do you 
have to heist it? You are really too poor to think, aren’t you. 
Look what you’ve said yourselves: “Fifty years have already past, since Jiang Jieshi with-
draw and Taiwan left the bosom of the motherland.” Ridiculous. Was Jiang Jieshi no 
Chinese, was his government not the Chinese government? I can see you do love your 
country, but you’re actually distorting history and producing secession. What if they 
looked at it from the opposite angle: “Since [we] lost the civil war, the mainland has left 
the bosom of the motherland? Sounds funny, doesn’t it? 
(…) 
… 
 Li San Is Coming [You want] to attack Taiwan and explicitly state you don’t care how 
many will die. What kind of logic is this, to victimize the lives of the Taiwanese „for the 
sake of the Taiwan people“? Do you really think that a war’s killing and wounding will 
be as precise as one shot from a rifle? 17.08.2002 23:23  
(…) 
War means suffering, for the other and for us. Peace is unconditional. Safeguarding the 
unity of China has to start with own efforts. Looking for new resources to [exploit and] 
run down after having run down the own country enough, isn’t it? To be a patriot means 
to love the country and the people. To think that patriotism means [Taiwan] must be re-
turned to us means the country is doomed.  
… 
 Kitty Makes Meow Meow Is there any tangible advantage the people could achieve from 
reunification? 17.08.2002 23:52  
(…) Taiwan, you, and Li San Is Coming, do you not all long for reunification? The moth-
erland cannot but always long for unification – – – – – what does this all mean? Mere talk-
ing about serving as soldiers is easy. Those who have really integrated into society, who 
have worked for many years, find corruption and injustice all around with the naked eye 
and see through XXX’s policy of brainwashing that wants us to become cannon fodder 
for attacking Taiwan. Just to give certain people the opportunity to reclaim for them-
selves the historic title of Commander of Reunification – no way!  
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Back to the previous [posting]: How many inhabitants has Taiwan? How big is Taiwan? 
China[‘s territory] is so huge; Mongolia has become independent, why not Taiwan? I 
don’t give a shit. 
(…) 
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… 
 Hu Che15 Brainless 19.08.2002 19:09  
(…) Once we laughed about Taiwan when there happened to be a big beating in their 
parliament. But was this not kind of a manifestation of democratic politics? Let’s look at 
ourselves. In our People’s Congress all the hands are always raised for approval. Is this 
any better, is this democracy? Why is Taiwan not willing to reunify [with us]? It’s be-
cause currently politics in the mainland are less democratic than in Taiwan. In Taiwan 
you can publicly curse the president, you can have oppositional parties, and freedom of 
the press, you can demonstrate; can you do this in the mainland? In the whole country 
there are so many press products, but reading one you know them all; all of them speak-
ing with one voice. You won’t hear any deviant voice, won’t hear any oppositional opin-
ion; isn’t this appalling? I don’t like to see Taiwan separated from China and independ-
ent, but I’d like to change for a different way to solve [the problem of national reunifica-
tion] and would like China to be really democratic and free after reunification. 
Those who at the top of their voices call for an attack on Taiwan actually are brainless; it’s 
only a manifestation of close-minded nationalism. Be a great thinker; use your brain be-
fore you talk!  
… 
 I Am So Tender Long live peace! 21.08.2002 12:18  
… 
 Lin Chufang Recapturing Taiwan through military force? Go to bloody hell! 21.08.2002 
13:03  
… 
 yyyxyz There shall be peace everywhere in the mainland and in Taiwan! 21.08.2002 13:42  
Mainland and Taiwan people must not kill each other. Men’s lives and the peaceful well-
being of the people are much stronger driving forces than that apparently noble cause! 
Let those warmongers fight each other! 
(BBS Youth Topics 2002o) 
 
Hence, from the Party state’s perspective, the Taiwan question probably will not have the 
potential for mobilizing people for any but symbolic actions. Both the more individualized 
and narcissistic youngest age groups and the financially more settled middle classes for dif-
ferent reasons are hardly willing to sacrifice their personal well-being for the nation, least in 
regard of reuniting Taiwan with the Chinese mainland through military force (also compare 
Johnston 2004: 617f., 623-626). 
Generally speaking, there is a general consensus that every Chinese should be expected to 
be an upright patriot, ambitious to make China a super power. But although sharing strong 
patriotic feelings is almost generally considered to be the duty of every Chinese citizen as 
thread 18 suggests, this does not mean that there is any clear-cut concept of patriot-
ism/nationalism, neither prescribed by the Party state nor constructed alternatively.  
                                                     
15  This pseudonym probably means “Nonsense”. I assume that the author used homonyms, because 
this pseudonym already was in use by another participant. 
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Thread 18 
 sihouyusheng111@CR Reflect on yourself! 16.09.2002 21:16 
(…) We, the young people should not be satisfied just by leading a comfortable life. We 
also should not just fatalistically accept everything as fate like our preceding generation 
did. Our generation shall straighten the still weak Chinese back! The Chinese people is 
the most excellent nation in the world; we should reflect, should know what we have to 
do. We have the power to make China a global power!!  
(BBS Exploring Culture 2002d) 
 
Hence at present it might not be alternative models of national identification and competing 
agencies resulting thereof, but rather the ignorance and neglect large parts particularly of the 
younger urban population normally demonstrate in this respect, that may challenge the politi-
cal leadership of the CCP. National Day for instance, normally central to the national imagi-
nary, in virtual as in physical places of urban China is only celebrated as an additional public 
holiday providing an opportunity for meeting with friends and eating out (cf. threads 19, 23).  
 
Thread 19 
The Girl Is Young 1020 When I was living in Beijing I did not like Beijing! 10.01.2002 14:15  
But now that I moved to Shanghai I still like Beijing more. Maybe it’s because I have been 
used to culture and food of Beijing. Moreover, I personally think that Beijing is the better 
place to be particularly when a holiday draws near that involves very strong national 
sentiments such as National Day, because there you can feel the link with the mother-
land. In other places, however, it’s purely another public holiday, rest for the people, but 
not at all linked to the birthday of the nation. This is not to say that other cities are bad, 
only that there I don’t feel this kind of enthusiastic passion like in Beijing!  
(BBS Fashion, Eating, Living, Motion 2002c) 
 
National symbols or icons of the modern Chinese state as well as specialized patriotic TV 
shows once in high regard are only sought for by the country folk, whereas they are gener-
ally disliked and avoided by younger urbanites up to their 40s (Giese 2003b). While foreign 
businesses demonstrate their sympathy for the Chinese nation by large-sized congratula-
tions to China and by displaying the Chinese flag and state symbols in quite a number of 
variations (Giese 2003b), the average urban Chinese seem to be preoccupied with shopping 
and dining, even rather playfully displaying the national flag of the USA as major competi-
tor in world politics on their T-shirts, bags and toys (Giese 2003b) than honoring own na-
tional symbols. Hence, if nationalism or national identity were not regarded central issues 
any more by growing strata of young Chinese, the general self-perception and projected 
image of the communist party as spearhead of the national project may also lose much of its 
legitimizing power in the field of domestic politics. 
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6. Local Identities and Sub-local Affiliation – Field for Identification and Collective 
Agency 
On the other end of the same scale of collective identities and community building there is  
– first of all – identification based on the place of birth or place of abode, whereas the latter 
gains importance since more and more Chinese and particularly the well educated strata of 
the Chinese population enjoy the freedom to choose their place of living and working. 
Probably due to the central role locality is playing in everyday life the sheer number of re-
lated postings gives strong empirical evidence within the surveyed bulletin boards that 
identification with the physical place of abode and the collective identity built upon shared 
imaginations of place and community in a given place are much stronger and salient than 
the somehow abstract and latent collective identity of being a Chinese citizen. Although vir-
tually all members of the surveyed online and offline populations tend to identify them-
selves as members of the Chinese nation in one way or the other, it seems to be the identifi-
cation with the place of living that is the much more constituting element of self-perception. 
For the inhabitants of metropolises like Beijing and Shanghai in particular it is central to be a 
Beijing citizen or a Shanghainese. Moreover, the discourse on local identities seems to be 
based on a complete and widely accepted hierarchy of Chinese places and ascribed identi-
ties. In this way the leading role of Beijing and Shanghai as cities appears undisputed, al-
though these two are competing with each other for primacy. The following thread 20 illus-
trates the pride to be a citizen of either of these two metropolises and the competition be-
tween them. 
 
Thread 20 
Little Que_mirage A Beijing girl’s impressions from Shanghai... 27.05.2002 16:06 
At Spring Festival this year I stayed in Shanghai for two days, had already heard that Bei-
jingers and Shanghainese absolutely do not make a good match, and also knew about the 
many spleens of the Shanghai people. This time I experienced it personally; must say, 
they really live up to it!!  
(…) 
What’s more, no matter if it’s a small restaurant or a big one, people are particularly 
noisy when they are eating. If it were only chatting loudly, but they are eating very nois-
ily, as well.  
Of course, I do not like the Shanghainese, however you have no other choice but to love 
the city itself. A modern metropolis has to be fully infused with the atmosphere of com-
mercial culture. In cultural terms, however, Shanghai is by far less tolerant and open than 
Beijing, [and people] stick to their niminy-piminy petty bourgeoise mentality, which 
somehow makes them idealize their own weird manners even more.  
(BBS Fashion, Eating, Living, Motion 2002d) 
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Positive identification with the own place of abode in this respect always also includes nega-
tive stereotypes ascribed to other places and the related collective identities of the people 
living there, as both the previous thread 20 and the following thread 21 illustrate.  
 
Thread 21 
 jgj0510@CR Regarding people in Northeast China 01.07.2002 23:27 
I always thought people in the Northeast were up-front and accostable. 
What I experienced before ’99 was just like that. But since I have started working I had to 
realize how absurd this notion had been. All the Northeasterners I have met after ’99 
have been knavish; there hasn’t been any exception. I really cannot understand that there 
are still people getting off stating “Northeasterners are all living Lei Fengs”, brazen-faced. 
One should downright say „all the Northeasterners are impudent“, period. 
 zhihai969_NEW Prejudice 21.07.2002 02:24 
No matter of South or North, people are so different from each other. 17 years ago I 
lived in the Northeast, had a whole bunch of friends; Northeasterners are very sound. 
Youngster, you’re either ignorant or off your rocker!  
 Tourist 1203165680 You are a Sichuanese 02.07.2002 17:34 
For sure, must be 
(BBS Exploring Culture 2002e) 
 
It was also this context of identity discourses closely related to locality that induced other-
wise anonymous participants of bulletin boards to reveal most detailed and intimate infor-
mation on their offline existence. The following thread 22 – although focusing on a different 
topic – is a good example of the amount of information Chinese BBS participants reveal 
about themselves and accumulate about each other’s real life contexts respectively (see also 
thread 23). 
 
Thread 22 
 Radish He Please kill the ID Small Room Named Quiet Sky – a complaint to mananger 
Liu Xuehong, moderators Li Fang and 007 25.10.2002 23:06  
I’ve been in China Youth [Online] for almost two years. This is my very first time to file 
an official complaint to the administration of China Youth [Online] in order to expel an 
Internet friend. Hopefully, my request will be treated seriously. In order to show my se-
riousness, I’m not using the emoticon “nonsense”, I usually do.  
Recently there has been an Internet friend from Da Xian, Sichuan with the ID Small 
Room Named Quiet Sky, who is continuously posting articles without any content, 
spamming, insulting and humiliating other Internet friends, leading to constant quarrel. 
Logging in to the BBS I cannot read postings as usual, hence wasting my time and energy 
and having my rights and interests damaged.  
For these reasons I officially hand in this complaint to the administration of China Youth 
[Online]. I fear that at this moment neither the technical means nor the personal capacities 
of China Youth [Online] are sufficient for effectively limiting the behavior of this ID or ef-
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fectively diminishing my sufferings caused by this ID. Meanwhile, the doings of this ID 
should be considered not qualifying for the protection of the freedom of speech. For the 
above mentioned reasons, I earnestly ask the administration of China Youth [Online] to 
kill the ID Small Room Named Quiet Sky in order to stop the disturbance this ID does 
everyday both to the [Bulletin] Board and to me.  
 
Looking forward to your reply! 
 
Radish He 
25.10.2002 
 
 Cat in a Basket Not yet reached a stadium that calls for expulsion, right 25.10.2002 
23:09 
 Crooked Mouth I agree with the point of view of Internet friend Radish He 25.10.2002 
23:10 
Expel a certain elementary school teacher Small Room Named Quiet Sky from Da 
Xian, Sichuan, who is shamelessly proud of using a faked diploma. 
 Small Room Named Quiet Sky Quite right! I was just waiting for you to show up! 
25.10.2002 23:10 
Those guys pretend to believe in justice unshakably after scolding me. 
Tell you something, if my TD is blocked, you will have to face the same fate! 
Who do you think you are to scold me? Oh! Are you expecting me to thank you after 
you’ve scolded me? Unless you are really such a person!  
I did scold you, but it was you who had asked for it! 
 Small Room Named Quiet Sky Crooked Mouth, I’m waiting for you, the impudent 
party secretary of China Youth [Online], to argue with me, anytime! 25.10.2002 23:12 
(…) 
… 
(BBS Youth Topics 2002p) 
 
Those who positively identified with their place of abode were eager to reveal and also 
prove their identities as Shanghainese, citizens of Beijing, Shenzhen, Guangzhou or 
Chongqing. Some even referred to certain districts and distinct living quarters. Those, how-
ever, who lived in places generally viewed as less favorable, usually preferred to relate 
themselves to the next larger geographic entity – usually the closest big city or the province 
their living place was situated in. 
The fact that discourses on local identities caused members of bulletin boards on the Chinese 
Internet to give up at least part of their sheltering pseudonymity for the purpose of distinct 
geographical positioning can be regarded as evidence for the strong binding force of place 
based collective identities constructed along geographical boundaries of small territorial 
units within China. Place or locality based constructs, it seems, are much more potent in 
providing the core functions of collective identity for the individual such as demarcation, 
emotional bonding and meaning (cf. Schöpflin 2001; Lear 1998; Bourdieu 1993) than more 
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abstract constructs of identity. Moreover, individuals joining together for social interaction 
because of shared geographical positioning or strong affinity towards a given locality and 
resulting exclusionary acts is one of the most prevalent phenomena within Chinese bulletin 
boards and can be observed much more frequently than any other comparable pattern of 
community building based on pre-existing collective identities. Shared collective identities 
grounded on place or locality, however, do not only provide the basis for building strong 
emotional bonds that are restricted to the virtual space of the Internet. On the contrary, 
wherever this shared collective identity is tied to a city or town, it provides the opportunity 
for social interaction to transcend the boundaries of the virtual space and to invade the 
physical reality of a given locality, as well. 
A huge number of direct or indirect hints on this transcendental nature of social interaction 
among Internet users who share place identities shows that this is by far not only a theoreti-
cal option. Within the surveyed bulletin boards there were a large numbers of participants 
for instance from Shanghai and Beijing – migrants who strongly identified with their new 
place of abode included – who sporadically met offline. Some groups even met quite fre-
quently over a long time while others even made these meetings regular events in fixed 
places (see thread 23). However, these offline meetings in no case had the result – as one 
might have expected – that virtual places were replaced by physical places as venues for 
social interaction within communities based on shared identities tied to locality. On the con-
trary, offline meetings obviously had the effect that online communication also intensified 
and social interaction developed in a complementary and integrated way in the virreal spa-
tial continuum consisting of both virtual and physical places. 
 
Thread 23 
Once He Flies FB16-notification, addressing all peace loving people 17.09.2002 17:12  
You like to experience the elegant appearance of Salt Meat, the tremendous charms of 
Seeds, and the imaginative humour of [Blue Sky, White Clouds and] Fish Head person-
ally? Register now for the Shanghai FB activity of [BBS] Fashion, Eating [Living, Motion]. 
Time: Thursday. Place: Not yet decided. 
larare Hey, Once [He] Flies 17.09.2002 21:38  
Shouting so loudly to lure us to FB, I would offend you, if I were unable to come.  
Thank goodness, I already have an air ticket, no problem. Will phone you on Thursday 
upon arrival. Notify me about time and place, okay.  
Will Seeds come to Shanghai, too? What a lucky break. Last time she came to Beijing I 
did not meet her. Great that this time all will be able to meet in Shanghai. 
                                                     
16  FB stands for “fubai” (literally: corruption) and is the term commonly used by Chinese netizens 
for offline meetings, because they usually involve excessive eating and drinking – habits that are 
regarded typical for corrupt civil-servants. 
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Alltime Darling 9992 Sigh, if it only were National Day 17.09.2002 20:28  
I am living in Nantong, I have admired FB for a long time, but the time is too incon-
venient, will be difficult to come. I beg you, organize another one on National Day!  
Blue Sky, White Clouds and Fish Head Me? 17.09.2002 20:13  
Probably will be very late and I think I will not eat [with you]. But it’s not sure, who 
knows? I will try to finish the meal with the others early to meet you as soon as possi-
ble. Take your time and don’t leave early. 
smilepinocchio Big event 17.09.2002 19:15  
I will think about it 
Wish the event to be a success, shall emphasize the central role of Shanghai!  
No. 9 Ku17 an18 17.09.2002 19:04 
No. 9 Ku Why Thursday? 17.09.2002 19:04 
I’m in Hangzhou, can’t come! 
Vegetable Farmer In The Sunshine I 17.09.2002 19:01 
want to meet Salt Meat ------- elegant appearance is reason enough. 
No doubt want to meet Seeds ----- coz havn’t met [her] yet and even more coz of the 
tremendous charms  
And Fish Head, yeah! Otherwise I had nobody to drink with --- tell me, where did you 
have dinner yesterday? 
Water Says [I] register 17.09.2002 18:13 
Finally, the longed for FB again. 
Not Thinking of Tomorrow Ha, caught you flat-footed 17.09.2002 18:15 
Did your homework too sloppy! Do it once more from the beginning! You only 
think of FB….. 
Not Thinking of Tomorrow Ooh, I’m going to spit blood 17.09.2002 17:26 
FB, here we go again!! 
Uuuuuh uuuh uuuuuuh 
pongkey I 17.09.2002 17:17 
can’t register, but I suggest to upload some photographs after FB … 
… 
(BBS Fashion, Eating, Living, Motion 2002e) 
 
Local affiliation and the construction of place based identities transcending the virtual 
sphere of the Internet alone do not pose any challenge to the political balance of power. 
There is, however, a large number of issues that are widely discussed within virtually all 
Chinese bulletin boards and at the same time have the potential to induce place based collec-
tivities to develop the sense of agency that is necessary for political action. Members of bul-
                                                     
17  This nickname consists of the first two characters of the Chinese translation for Kubera, the ninth 
of the sixteen Buddhist Arhats. In Chinese it is common to add the numbers to the names, hence 
“No. 9 Kubera”. Kubera is worshipped as patron saint and god of wealth helping to increase the 
worshipper’s financial resources, casting off poverty and all economic burdens. 
18  The author probably mistakenly pressed the “Enter” key one step too early before having con-
verted the Hanyu Pinyin into Chinese characters, since he also starts his next posting, which fol-
lows within a minute, with the character “an” (Shandong dialect for: I). 
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letin boards voice a lot of discontent in regard of corruption, abuse of political and financial 
power, weak performance of public institutions, general social problems, labor relations, 
consumer issues and so on. The following quotations demonstrate two of the most common 
perspectives. Referring to a complicated case involving parents who obviously considerably 
contributed to the death of their child by waiting too long inactively but shifted the blame to 
the attending physician at the university hospital, the hapless doctor who then was beaten 
up by thugs hired by the parents, intimidated or indifferent colleagues and superiors, and a 
corrupt administration that refused to investigate into this case, the first author (thread 24) 
still expresses some hope for the better, if only higher authorities on the central level paid 
attention to local problems. The second writer (thread 25), however, drawing general con-
clusions from own experiences, demonstrates a high degree of disillusionment and deep-
rooted distrust in the political and administrative institutions of the Chinese state in general. 
 
Thread 24 
Li San Is Coming Police and criminals under one roof! Government and underworld under 
one roof! General Secretary Jiang should hear this story! 14.05.2002 19:30 
Ask Speechless Wind to write a letter to the National Party [Leadership] on behalf of the 
university.  
If the provincial government saw to this case, it easily could be dealt with as simple „dis-
pute about medical treatment“. However, the main issue here is that police and criminals 
are collaborating, the big problem of government and underworld working hand in glove 
with each other. That’s not a problem an ordinary department is able to solve.  
(BBS Youth Topics 2002q) 
 
Thread 25 
Going Online Because Of Boredom Will the reactionary rule be restored in China? 
19.06.2002 14:17  
Today I went to the labor office to look for a part-time student job and they cheated me 
out of 10 Yuan. 10 Yuan are not a big deal, but – viewed from a different angle – there is 
cattiness everywhere in this society, nothing that you really can rely on. It’s not the first 
time that I was cheated, but that doesn’t mean that I have not enough experience in soci-
ety. The first time I had been cheated out of 50. I thought, there still must be something 
reliable, but what is the result? Complete disillusionment. Once I got angry, I had to think 
about many social phenomena. Think about the social environment around us. Can one 
just say this is modern civilization??? Full of the stench of money but without any hu-
manity, this state of society makes me doubt China’s future. The future development will 
be spoiled by this scum. They even go so far to say universities were not important. Soci-
ety is the best high school, [they say], and who needs to study at universities. How do 
they dare to publicly insult the students? As long as this kind of scum exists, all the talk 
about development is idle. No-one really cares for the needs of the ordinary people. 
Every department affirms to be devoted to administering and public welfare, but which 
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of them is not only trying to reap profits. Is the market society really like this, a society in 
which money has the only say?! When I had been cheated that time, I was thinking about 
defeating them by law, but reality would have prevented my victory. Since this labor of-
fice could just act recklessly like this, they must have some strong backing, a powerful in-
stitution providing rear cover. There was no way for me to win over them. I have no idea 
what means I could adopt against these people. Perhaps a country that has opted for so-
cialism with Chinese characteristics is just like this, all these things you can’t bear or deal 
with rationally. How many decades do we still have to live in such a society? If we have 
to be so cautious everyday, are you still willing to trust? China has established every kind 
of bigger or smaller regulations, but what has really been brought under control? The or-
dinary people only feel more and more helpless. Our government is not the government 
of the people. The authorities that we potentiated ourselves cannot fulfill their duties for 
us. Such a motherland??!!!!! How can we wholeheartedly love her? How can we be fully 
confident in her??? There are so many things that frustrate [me]. I am convinced that eve-
rybody has also experienced, witnessed or heard about [such things]. May I ask if you 
can feel at ease? Is it possible that the reactionary rule is really about to be restored in 
China??????!!!!! 
(BBS Youth Topics 2002r) 
 
On first sight these discourses seem to be either rather general and unqualified utterances of 
dissatisfaction with the individual situation and the development of the country in general 
or are only reflecting the media coverage mostly on prominent individual cases that are not 
too closely or directly related to the lives of those who pick up these topics within the bulle-
tin boards: For example individual corrupt officials and politicians are widely blamed as 
soon as the official Chinese mass media report the cases; TV and newspapers are the most 
important sources of information and are regarded particularly reliable (cf. Guo 2005: 37, 
47f., 66-72).  
Closer investigation of such discussions, however, reveals that media coverage very often 
only triggers related discourses but is not the underlying cause. In the case of Beijing for 
instance the preparation for the Olympic Games 2008 are often targeted. On one hand Inter-
net users see ample evidence for both squander mania and embezzlement of funds within 
the city’s administration. On the other hand there is under-funding and negligence of 
schools and universities and incompetence among the responsible administrations. Since 
many of the participants of the surveyed bulletin boards obviously are students and young 
parents, these two issues were in most cases not discussed separately but viewed as two 
sides of one and the same medal (see thread 26).  
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Thread 26 
liziwenriyi@CR I’ve got the same feeling, and this is maddening! 17.10.2002 20:00 
I am not from the Northwest, but I was allocated a university place at a university in the 
Northwest. The Northwest accounts for almost one half of the Chinese territory, and the 
population also counts by many, many hundred millions. The geographical position [i.e. 
latitude and altitude] is not less favorable than that of Beijing; and the people are not 
more backward than those in Beijing, as well. It’s just because this vast territory has been 
neglected all those many years of reform and opening up, that today education in the 
Northwest is lacking so much behind. Why does Beijing have the power to channel the 
taxpayers’ money into its own development? Does Beijing also have the right to do so? 
Should there be special treatment for the capital? Spending so much money for construc-
tion, just for applying to host the Olympic Games. Has this money been Beijing’s money? 
The education in the vast Northwest seems unimportant. If even in the Northwest educa-
tion is completely neglected, what can you expect from [the campaign to] Opening up the 
West? Education is fundamental, and the West doesn’t have her own talents. Should it be 
unavoidable to produce enormous inequalities during development? Will it help the 
people or harm them? 
Don’t say no more. That’s China, exemplary. I’d like to cry out loud, but who’d listen? 
(BBS Exploring Culture 2002f) 
 
Moreover, these discussions were not theoretical in nature but rather reflected a developed 
sense of agency. Communication even sometimes ended up in the call for collective action of 
those affected by particular cases. This shows that there can develop a sense of agency on 
the common basis of shared place, as soon as individuals sharing this place identity face 
similar problems and are directly affected. Noise, air pollution and other environmental is-
sues – and the related question of real estate market value – obviously provide strong 
enough stimuli necessary for developing this common sense of agency among otherwise 
differently positioned groups of individuals. Like in the following quotation (thread 27), 
circumstances or developments that are of common concern are openly criticized, but collec-
tive action is usually not directly called for due to the general political situation. 
 
Thread 27 
Having A Peek While Passing By Fashion, Eating, Living and Motion looks at Suzhou 
31.08.2002 17:24 
(…) The living quarters of Suzhou have been developed without any plan, chaotic; this 
means that for some inhabitants the living environment is rather bad. In the neighbor-
hood of Suzhou’s biggest chemical plant there are already living huge numbers of people. 
But for several reasons this factory cannot be moved away. Hence the masses of the 
neighborhood are forced to live with the daily stench. This is what I call “building a cre-
matory in the midst of the city“, but it doesn’t mean that the crematory was built in the 
midst of the living quarters, rather the development of the city resulted in large living 
quarters completely encroaching upon the crematory. This has already been the situation 
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for many years now. The [city] government of Suzhou has the duty to prevent the people 
from smelling the stench of “rotten eggs” and “cremated corpses”.  
(…) Moreover, [the fact that] petrol-operated mopeds have been allowed at haphazard 
resulted in severe pollution problems for the old quarters of the city (you cannot imagine 
more than one hundred thousand mopeds running around the less than twenty square 
kilometres of the old city coughing out thick black fumes). In the meantime Suzhou has 
begun to issue licenses for private cars. I’m sure that this soon will prove to be just an-
other big blunder. 
(…) 
What’s the problem? Personally I’m convinced that our government is naïve to the core. 
This naivety of administration becomes evident from the following little story. At the 
moment the Suzhou government is introducing a project to have one water meter in 
every individual household. This means that funding will come from government, enter-
prises and citizens (approximately 40-50 millions), and every home will be provided with 
a water pipe connecting to a [new] water meter on the ground floor or outside of the 
building, which will replace the water meters that were placed inside the flats [till now]. 
It has been said that this shall facilitate the water supply company’s work to read the in-
dividual meters of every apartment, save water, make things more comfortable for the 
citizens, reduce the disputes about the subdivision of fees between main and individual 
meters, and so on. And the reality? Actually, every understanding person will know that 
to solve the problems it only needs a couple of laid-off workers to be sent into every 
household to read the meters. But the local government intends to spend umpteen mil-
lions for a solution! 
(BBS Fashion, Eating, Living, Motion 2002f) 
 
There are more examples for the development of agency related to both personal lives and 
political questions on the grass roots level. Such issues included the own professional future 
or the future of ones’ children – as associated to formal institutional education. These were 
always viewed as directly related to inadequate political action, incompetence or corruption 
within the political administrations of a given place. These issues ranged from being directly 
affected by the emissions of a chemical plant in Suzhou quoted above to the more general 
and fundamental criticism of city planning in Beijing, which was regarded as focusing on 
motorized traffic and neglecting the legitimate rights of pedestrians and thus sacrificing the 
general quality of life within the city. Legitimate rights, legitimacy of administrative action 
and legal rights of individuals and collectivities similarly have moved center stage. Al-
though there is a lot of criticism pointing at the deficiencies of the Chinese legal system, the 
notion of pursuing one’s legitimate rights by legal means becomes more and more wide-
spread. 
It is particularly the new Chinese urban middle class striving for house ownership that 
forms a newly emerging rights-savvy populace. By now they call, for instance, for safe-
guarding their property rights as home owners, for better environmental standards around 
their compounds or better quality schooling for their children in their very places of abode 
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(Giese 2003b). But the socio-economic development of China also provided them with more 
space to exercise these rights. As discussions within Chinese bulletin boards already show 
today, groups sharing collective identities tied to virtual and physical place also begin to 
address politically more sensitive issues like freedom of information, the protection of per-
sonal privacy or political participation on the grass roots level. The following excerpts (see 
thread 28) from a fervid online discussion on the blocking of access to the search engine 
Google for Chinese Internet users, which coincided with the preparations for the 16th Con-
gress of the Chinese Communist Party in the 80th year after its founding, provide only one of 
many examples. 
 
Thread 28 
 Flying Freely Propose that all big BBS of the Internet shall organize demonstrations to 
sharply protest against the blocking of GOOGLE. Please sign your names everybody for 
support! 02.09.2002 10:32 
… 
 Flying Freely Even this little bit of convenience is unbearable for certain people; for a 
successful political ceremony of one party they 02.09.2002 10:44  
pull out all the stops. 
 State Power Sign! 02.09.2002 10:57 
… 
Thin Bamboo I think certain people should be charged with breaching the constitution; 
those friends who knowledgeable in law, pen an indictment! 02.09.2002 11:09 
… 
 Yan Nan Can consider to charge the telecommunications enterprises 02.09.2002 11:21 
… 
 lilybright Agree; is there anything we could do? 02.09.2002 11:22 
 Flying Freely Everybody should see that this posting will fly around everywhere. Let 
the people know that there is this public opinion. You must sign in order to condemn 
02.09.2002 11:25 
… 
 Heavenly Steed Soaring Across the Skies1030 Strange, what content might google 
have that the authorities cannot stand? 02.09.2002 11:58 
 Flying Freely Exactly 02.09.2002 12:13 
 Ridiculous Even google has been blocked too 02.09.2002 12:23 
… 
 372119 The law is strong, but the out-laws are ten times stronger. 02.09.2002 12:23 
… 
 cvc Means the netizens were raped!!!!!!!!!!!!! 02.09.2002 13:12 
 Flying Freely Protest, file a sharp protest, approach an international human rights or-
ganization, ask the what’s its name without Borders for assistance 02.09.2002 13:21 
                                                     
19  This nick name probably is an allusion to a colloquial figure of speech meaning “shouldn’t mind 
someone that much”. 
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… 
 Crusader Count me for one 02.09.2002 14:31 
… 
 Ridiculous I want to buy a white Tshirt and write something in support of google on it 
02.09.2002 16:43 
I will begin mobilizing the masses, protecting the basic rights  
… 
 newzz Strongly oppose the closing down of GOOGLE 02.09.2002 17:52 
 liuxianzhi Support by signing 02.09.2002 17:53 
… 
 Scalpel The closing down of GOOGLE by the telecom represents a political act (for-
warded [text]) 02.09.2002 18:28 
 Ridiculous If there is a political reason 02.09.2002 18:30 
… 
 Chairman Mau20 Strongest protest against the blocking of GOOGLE 02.09.2002 22:03 
 Sharpener I also sign 02.09.2002 22:06 
 Red Foliage on Fragrant Hill Just sign, if you want to. But don’t exchange it for can-
dies later on, well ~~~~~~~~~~ 02.09.2002 22:09 
 Mafia Supremo Go abroad, go abroad everybody! 02.09.2002 22:15 
… 
 clmcyl I miss google, I hate …. 02.09.2002 23:21 
 Young Person Named Zhang Let the banner of freedom flaunt in the wind 02.09.2002 
23:35 
… 
 Roda JC If normal access to google will not be restored 03.09.2002 08:47 
… 
 Roda JC There are already some hackers on the move now 03.09.2002 09.25 
… 
 Ridiculous Look how public opinion gets raped 03.09.2002 10:08 
 Ice Storm Sharp protest! 03.09.2002 10:30 
… 
 Crane on the Horizon Listening to the voice of the people is more important than pro-
tection against flooding. Old lesson!!!! 03.09.2002 10:35 
 Reflection of Clear Sunlight on Water That’s the way freedom is lost!! 03.09.2002 
11:11 
… 
 Idolizing Numbers What will be the next? 03.09.2002 14:06 
… 
 Ridiculous The closing of google revealed some really bad omens 03.09.2002 15:19 
… 
 Chairman Mau The motives behind the blocking of GOOGLE are to provoke the 
masses of netizens, the motives are to disturb social stability, the motives are to make 
the Chinese civilization move backwards 03.09.2002 16:40 
                                                     
20  In this nick name a homonym (meaning “cat”) is used instead of the family name Mao of Mao 
Zedong, the Great Helmsman. 
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 Chairman Mau The closing down of GOOGLE represents an open move against \ 
the**Three**Representations21 03.09.2002 16:52 
… 
 One with a Bug If one is to sign, the real name should be signed 03.09.2002 19:41 
 Kitty Makes Meow Meow I do sign my real name 03.09.2002 19:47 
… 
 Heavenly Steed Soaring Across the Skies1030 That google had been blocked made me 
understand many things in China…… 02.09.2002 22:42 
 No. 4 Reached an even deeper understanding of what insolent means 02.09.2002 23:34 
(BBS Youth Topics 2002s) 
 
The Internet and its communication forums in particular may serve as a tool for channeling 
and organizing shared interests into social and political action. Reports on private home-
owner groups creating their own communication forums on the Internet promoting the dis-
cussion and collective decision making show that community building, formation of collec-
tive identities and social interaction not only transcend the virtual and reach into the physi-
cal reality of given places but also vice versa (cf. ABC 2005).  
 
 
7. Conclusion: Greatest Challenges from the Urban Grass Roots 
In the preceding passages I have demonstrated that Internet and physical places in China 
today can be regarded as an interconnected and interdependent spatial continuum in which 
construction and renegotiation of collective identities and resulting social interaction de-
velop in an integrated way. This process has been realized and used by Chinese authorities 
for the political management of anti-Japanese demonstrations in the first half of 2005 and 
will be further promoted by recent developments towards a greater convergence of offline 
and online media. Observations in August 2005 in Shanghai showed that more and more 
radio and TV stations as well as print media have created bulletin boards in order to attract 
and tie audiences to their more traditional services. No doubt, the integration of offline and 
online experiences and also of virtual and physical places will grow further. The political 
relevance of this process is obvious, as well. The outcome for the political system and the 
balance of power within China, however, is completely open. 
A number of identity related processes initiated in virtual places possess the potential to 
challenge the dominance of the Chinese Communist Party. The models for unified collective 
identification propagated by the party are put into question already today. In the field of 
national identity, however, this process is largely unconscious, characterized rather by igno-
                                                     
21  The Three Representations are Jiang Zemin’s invention and contribution to Chinese socialist the-
ory. 
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rance and lack of interest among growing numbers particularly of young Chinese than by 
actively challenging the hegemonic model through constructing alternative national models 
of identity. The absence of discourses related to national identity within BBS Online Ro-
mance, the bulletin board that is frequented by the youngest group of Internet users under 
observation, gives clear evidence of this tendency. Although no distinct alternative to party 
orthodoxy seems to exist by now and competing models of Chineseness existing elsewhere  
– as Hong Kong and Taiwan identities or even as transnational Chineseness – do not appear 
attractive enough for young Chinese urban middle classes, the party might face the necessity 
of continuous efforts to provide a shared sense of agency related to its model of national 
identity. Otherwise negligence and the clear tendency to dissociate national identity from 
the ruling party and the government may result in decreasing political legitimacy of one-
party rule. This will be like playing with fire, as widespread and very outspoken criticism of 
the Chinese government over leniency towards perceived enemies clearly demonstrates. 
On the local level, however, there seem to develop collectivities that are tied to distinct 
physical or virtual places and can be characterized by their shared collective identities and a 
growing sense of agency. If the related phenomena discussed above will at least result in 
localized political action or even in the construction of collective identities based on mutual 
interests that transcend local boundaries (cf. Guo 2005: 88-91, 98-100) and form the sense of 
agency on a larger basis and higher level bearing the potential to challenge party hegemony 
and political power balance not only on the level of neighborhoods and city districts, re-
mains an open question. Although the analysis of relevant discourses within Chinese bulle-
tin boards shows a clear tendency to act for one’s legitimate interests and legal rights. There 
is, however, not much evidence yet for this feeling of agency having been translated into 
collective action.  
At this stage of development limited collective interests related to property rights and home 
ownership seem to bear the greatest potential to result in collective action, as for instance 
petitions by residents of private housing compounds against local industrial pollutors al-
ready give evidence of (cf. ABC 2005). Although beyond the scope of this article and without 
any evidence within the research project it is based on, scholars who are interested in the 
civil society function of temples and Christian churches in particular arrive at similar con-
clusions. Voluntary associations, they argue, form the beginnings of a civil society. Due to 
their fragmentation and localized nature, however,  
“civil society initiatives tend to be confined to particular localities and bound to their 
places rather than transcending them. Hence, social behavior and/or political action 
potentially challenging Party hegemony is also a local phenomenon defined by par-
ticular places, their structures and actors.” (Madsen 2004). 
Giese: Challenging Party Hegemony 43 
These examples and the well known and more or less successful efforts of the CCP to censor 
and manipulate discourses on particular politically sensitive issues of nationwide relevance 
show that potential challenges will rather develop both from the local level and from the 
more general insidious changes in orientations and lifestyles triggered not least from dis-
courses within the virreal spatial continuum than from direct confrontation on present po-
litical issues of greater reach. Moreover, it has become very obvious that not the pressing 
social problems of those marginalized within the reform process possess the potential for 
collective identification and agency, because the most affected groups – though a strong 
sense of agency can be assumed – lack the communicative channels for the construction of 
collectivities based on their mutual interests. The virreal spatial continuum is inhabited by 
the more privileged strata of the Chinese urban society (cf. Guo 2005: 15ff.); and since their 
members still are preoccupied with pursuing their own collective and individual interests 
rather than aiming at social justice for all, challenges for one-party rule are rather negligible 
at least at the time being.  
Both the Hong Kong experience and recent developments within the Chinese mainland it-
self have demonstrated the capacity of the CCP to integrate the relevant social groups and 
their interests into the current system thus providing advantages for both sides. The admis-
sion of entrepreneurs and capitalists to the Communist Party is only one outstanding exam-
ple of successfully perpetuating and legitimizing the current one-party rule through ap-
peasement. However, whether this will be a successful option in dealing with countless local-
ized collectivities and their similarly localized interests or growing numbers of educated 
urban youths eventually facing difficulties on the labor market and thus developing mar-
ginalized collective identities and corresponding agency, remains to be seen. Online com-
munication forums like the studied bulletin boards, however, might provide a venue for 
developing both shared collective identities and a sense of agency that transcend the narrow 
confines of any given physical locality. 
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